

Pointers for complying with the European Resilience Mandates

Your IIA Norway Risk Roundtable Hosts:





Ellen Brataas, CEO IIA Norway

Ellen has extensive industry and consulting experience across domains like risk management, internal audit and IT resilience. As CEO of IIA Norway she is continuously advancing GRC best practice and readiness in Scandinavia through peer exchanges, expert blogs and training.

GRC practitioners in the region and beyond draw on Ellen's thought leadership informed by her industry and consulting lens as well as insight from the IIA Norway network.

Chika Okoli, GRC Technology Manager


Chika Okoli is a GRC Technology Manager who helps organisations address GRC initiatives and mandates with technology. The throughline in his career has been digital transformation across domains like KYC, procurement, supply chain finance and GRC. Lately his focus has been the wave of resilience mandates, that he writes and speaks about at practitioner forums across Europe.



Some Housekeeping:

- A recording of the session will be made available to registrants and participants.
- The lines are not muted because this session will be interactive throughout.
- However, please mute yourself if you are not speaking to avoid audio issues.

Participation Options



A potpourri of European Resilience Mandates















Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive

The common direction of European Resilience Mandates

Critical
Third-Party
Risk
Management

Disruption Impact Mapping

Proactive Incident Management

Agenda:

Difficulties around Compliance

How GRC-tech helps Your & my Compliance Pointers



You collaborate with a sea of suppliers.


Who is a critical supplier here?




Who is a critical supplier here?



Determine Third-Party Criticality before incidents through connected (inherent) Risk Assessments







My Pointers for aligning on Criticality




- Settle on a common risk language (i.e. harmonise risk reporting etc.)
- Account for risk dimensions (i.e., processes, risk categories, threat vectors etc.)
- Create a third-party risk inventory (i.e. concentration risk, inherent risk etc.)


Pointers from the Risk Roundtable participants:

- Categorise suppliers based on critical services and applications they provide
- Account for the sourcing strategy, which could provide clues on criticality (i.e. some inherently risky activities might be outsourced→ hence the partners are likely critical)
- Use the litmus test "any supplier that can disrupt your operation is critical"
- Make criticality assessments a continuous practice with the appropriate tone at the top to drive the continuous evaluation
- Learn from breach notifications by identifying the critical suppliers that led to it.

Have you identified your important business services and set tolerances for the acceptable disruption?




Room for improvement in Disruption Impact Mapping



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Source: EU DORA Webinar Feb. 2023

GRC Technology eases Disruption Impact Mapping





Monitor the Resilience Chain & receive timely Business Continuity Alerts

Assets					^
C ₂					+ Asset
EDIT	NAME	RTC	RTO	IMPACT	TYPE
	Customer Information Database	0-2 Hours	0-2 Hours	Very high	Technology
	Microsoft Exchange Server 2019	4-12 Hours	0-2 Hours	High	Applications Used
	SAP ERP	\triangle	1-3 Days	—	IT
	SAP Finance	0-2 Hours	0-2 Hours	Moderate	IT

My Pointers for Disruption Impact Mapping



- Identify critical assets
- Map linkages to processes, affected stakeholders, regulatory dimensions etc.
- Set and monitor disruption tolerance (i.e. EU DORA, NIS2 and the UK's PRA requirements)

Pointers from the Risk Roundtable participants:

- Map the recovery sequence to ease the recovery prioritisation (i.e. Ascertain which assets need to be recovered first to be operational)
- Ensure that critical assets have Recovery Time Capabilities (RTCs) that are below the Recovery Time Objectives (RTOs) and monitor for unacceptable RTCs.
- Aggregate RTC/O data to arrive at the recovery metrics of your important business services (IBS) as a whole (i.e. the IBS recovery might be the sum of RTCs/Os of several assets that
 you identified beforehand-see my pointer above)

Filters

What are you looking for?

Sort by (optional)

Release Date

APPLY



Cybersecurity Alerts & Advisories

JUN 08, 2023 ALERT

CISA Releases Two Industrial Control Systems Advisories

JUN 08, 2023 ICS ADVISORY | ICSA-23-159-02

Sensormatic Electronics Illustra Pro Gen 4

JUN 08, 2023 ICS ADVISORY I ICSA-23-159-01

Atlas Copco Power Focus 6000

JUN 08. 2023 ALERT

VMware Releases Security Update for Aria Operations for Networks

JUN 07. 2023 ALERT

Mozilla Releases Security Updates for Multiple Products

JUN 07. 2023 ALERT

CISA Adds One Known Exploited Vulnerability to Catalog

JUN 07, 2023 CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY | AA23-158A

#StopRansomware: CL0P Ransomware Gang Exploits CVE-2023-34362 MOVEit

Vulnerability

JUN 07. 2023 - ALERT

CISA and FBI Release #StopRansomware: CL0P Ransomware Gang Exploits MOVEit Vulnerability

« First « Previous ... 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 ... Next > Last »

Integrate CISA Alerts & Advisories Into your Incident Management



Immediate actions from the CISA Alert can be executed with the help of GRC Technology

(i) ACTIONS TO TAKE TODAY TO MITIGATE CYBER THREATS FROM CLOP RANSOMWARE:

- 1. Take an inventory of assets and data, identifying authorized and unauthorized devices and software.
- Grant admin privileges and access only when necessary, establishing a software allow list that only executes legitimate applications.
- 3. Monitor network ports, protocols, and services, activating security configurations on network infrastructure devices such as firewalls and routers
- Regularly patch and update software and applications to their latest versions, and conduct regular vulnerability assessments.

Further actions:

1. Download the PDF/STIX/JSON version of the CISA report



AA23-158A PDF

(PDF, 740.97 KB)



(XML, 165.28 KB)

<u>↓</u> /

AA23-158A JSON

(JSON, 93.33 KB)

2. Apply Yara Rules to detect malicious activity

<pre>rule CISA_10450442_01 : LEMURLOOT webshell communicates_with_c2 remote_access {</pre>
meta:
Author = "CISA Code & Media Analysis"
Incident = "10450442"
Date = "2023-06-07"
Last_Modified = "20230609_1200"
Actor = "n/a"
Family = "LEMURLOOT"
Capabilities = "communicates-with-c2"
Malware_Type = "webshell"
Tool_Type = "remote-access"
Description = "Detects ASPX webshell samples"
SHA256_1 = "3a977446ed70b02864ef8cfa3135d8b134c93ef868a4cc0aa5d3c2a74545725b"
strings:
\$s1 = { 4d 4f 56 45 69 74 2e 44 4d 5a }
•

4. Track & Manage Task Completion

Add	Existing				Search	Q
	NAME	PRIORITY	DUE DATE	STATUS		
	Control not working, please follow up	 Moderate 	3/1/2022	EVALUATE		
	not working please follow up	● Moderate	3/1/2022	VALIDATE		
	Risk Action	Moderate	3/23/2022	COMPLET	ED	
	No Process and Controls in place with stolen/los	• High	3/26/2022	COMPLET	ED P	
	Recovery op lost/stolen equipment's	• High	3/26/2022	COMPLET	ED P	
	Inadequate control Vendor API Integration to det	Moderate	3/27/2022	COMPLET	ED	
	Ensure we are compliant with our regulators	• High	3/27/2022	COMPLET	ED P	
	Refresher training is needed to banking and oper	 Moderate 	5/31/2022	VALIDATE		





Files	Hash	Description
larabqFa.exe Qboxdv.dll	0e3a14638456f4451fe8d76fdc04e591fba942c2f16da31857ca66293a58a4c3	Truebot
%TMP%\7ZipSfx.000\Zoom.exe	1285aa7e6ee729be808c46c069e30a9ee9ce34287151076ba81a0bea0508ff7e	Spawns a PowerShell subprocess which executes a malicious DLL file
%TMP%\7ZipSfx.000\ANetDiag.dll	2c8d58f439c708c28ac4ad4a0e9f93046cf076fc6e5ab1088e8943c0909acbc4	Obfuscated malware which also uses long sleeps and debug



detection

analysis

Do you use free data sources and tools for threat monitoring and emerging risk management?



My Pointers for proactive Incident Management



- Incorporate threat, risk and incident advisories (i.e. CISA, MITRE ATT&CK etc.)
- Scan assets to pre-empt incidents
- Report latent threats, potential risk exposures and near-misses internally

Pointers from the Risk Roundtable participants:

- In addition to the free sources there are premium data sources and services that curate data for pre-empting incidents and utilise AI to reduce false negatives (i.e. <u>www.EPAM.com</u>)
- Reduce the attack surface by limiting devices to authorised and vetted ones (i.e.
 including internal threats through Active Directory management linked to authorised
 employee/user devices, access rights hardened with MFA ideally)
- Consider how network security changes over time due to management decisions with their knock-on effects on incident management



Let's keep the conversation going:





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Source of the Incident Management pointer and further sources for threat intelligence

www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23- 158a	Implement cyber threat management suggestions (the example from slide 17- 19).
www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories	Integrate CISA data and combine with automated GRC technology workflows.
https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de	Request membership of the Malpedia Malware Defence Group then integrate data for threat and risk management with GRC technology workflows.
https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.clop	Implement cyber threat management & detection suggestions from the <i>Malware Defence Group</i> .
https://github.com/xaitax/SploitScan	SploitScan is a free powerful and user-friendly tool designed by Alexander Hagenah, Head of Cyber Controls at SIX. It streamlines the process of identifying exploits for known vulnerabilities as well as the risk scoring of their respective exploitation probabilities.